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ABSTRACT
The ‘¶løqeia’ was, for Parmenides, nothing other than the very thing, which he 
discovered and gave it a name ‘tÿ ù’n’ for the first time. The denomination of a novel
concept like that of ‘tÿ ù’n’ inevitably forces one to grapple with a traditional system of
language, under which he is inevitably restricted and which comprises everything that is
already known.
The language necessarily presupposes a whole of conventional things that has been
traditionally established by social consensus or surroundings1). It is an original field
where the so-called Urdoxa casts its anchor2). The words of a language are fully charged
with various preconceptions imposed by collective usage, which may conceal and per-
vert the real state of things. In order to reveal the real state of things, one must un-
cover the veil of concealed facts.
Thus, the act of ¶lhqe›ein necessarily has to be a kind of apo-calypsis which could
be expressed by a series of negative terms such as ‘un-dressing,’ ‘un-covering,’ ‘un-veil-
ing,’ and so on. Seen from such a viewpoint, the Parmenidean Way of Truth might be
viewed as nothing other than the way of methodological negation3) by which the
naked and patent reality could be disclosed.
About 2500 years ago, Parmenides, an Western philosopher, went along this way to
¶løqeia, and came back again to the native land of mortals in order to tell them the
truth of tÿ ù’n in human language; namely the so-called Doxa-language.
By the way, contrasting with Parmenides’ case, it is very interesting that, in the sec-
ond and third centuries A. D., Nagarjuna, another philosopher in the East, followed a
very similar way of negation. He too preached to people on the doctrine of two truths,
namely truth relating to worldly convention on the one hand and truth in terms of ulti-
mate fruit on the other hand.
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Both philosophers’ motives and ways of thinking are so strikingly similar one another
that their theories of truth, which are originally based on a kind of divine revelation or
religious experience, will be worthy of comparison.
Ⅰ
Parmenides’ fragment Bl, 28-32 run as follows:
...................creÓ d° se pßnta puqûstai
æm°n ¶lhqeàhj e‹kukûoj ¶tremûj «tor
æd° brotÒn d’xaj o‹k †ni pàstij ¶lhqøj.
’¶ll’ †mphj kaã ta„ta maqøseai, Èj t™ doko„nta
cr≈n dokàmwj eênai di™ pantÿj pßnta perÒnta.
The cited locus is one of the most controversial passages in Parmenides’ fragments.
Leaving aside the details of my reading of the line 30 t–j, and the line 32 perÒnta4),
The pivotal points consist in “...cr≈n eênai”; especially in ‘t™ doko„nta’ and ‘dokàmwj.’ 
I present here my view in its essential points.
Having regard to the achievements in the past5), I think, it is preferable that ‘dokàmwj’
is to be taken as meaning ‘acceptably 6).’ In that case ‘t™ doko„nta’ have to naturally
refer to some objective things opined true by mortals, whereas from Goddess’ viewpoint
they are regarded as something like bricks with which ‘k’smon...ùpûwn ¶pathlÿn’
(fr.8.52) is constructed. Namely, I assume that Parmenides in this locus is notifying the
entrance of ‘morf™j...d›o’ in fr.8.53 and ‘fßoj kaã n›x’ in fr.9.1 beforehand. The assump-
tion will make “two forms” more neatly fit in the phrase “di™ pantÿj pßnta perÒnta,”
since ‘once all things have been named Light and Night,’ all things were filled equally
with both of them at the same time, so that ‘there is nothing which does not belong to
either’ (fr.9). Such being the case, finally, ‘eênai’ the complementary infinitive of ‘cr≈n’
modified by ‘dokàmwj’ (adverb) conveys some existential sense. Thus, the above quoted
lines can be translated as follows:
“You should learn all things, as well the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth as the
opinions of mortals in which there is no true belief. Nevertheless you shall learn these
things too, how it was necessary that the objects opined true by mortals, which per-
14 Vol. 37 No.３阪南論集　人文・自然科学編
The Double Truth in Parmenides and Nagajuna
Page:2無断転載禁止　
vade all things through all things, had to be acceptably.”
Thus, there is no doubt that Parmenides the Eleatic philosopher, drawing a clear line
between ‘¶lhqeàhj e‹kuklûoj ¶trem°j «tor’ and ‘brotÒn d’xaj’ on the one hand, noti-
fies beforehand the condition under which the latter should obtain a kind of acceptabili-
ty or reliability on the other hand; to put it tersely, a kind of human truth endorsed by
the divine truth of the real7).
The fact may give a considerable weight to scholars who somehow concede that
¶løqeia and d’xa are two sides of the same reality and who read the last part of Fr.8.38
as ‘t¸ pßnt’ ‘n’mastai’ (the reading E). Of course, there can be various counter-argu-
ments on this reading, including the view that the verb ‘nomßzesqai in Parmenides has a
double nominative so that it cannot be connected with a dative8). 
Nevertheless, I think that “t¸” here must refer to “tÿ ù’n in some way9).” For it is
indisputable that Parmenides gave his approval to the case that the legitimate naming
had to always obtain in relation to their genuine referent. The so-called “empty (or
“mere”) name” is so called because of its insulated relation to the genuine referent. In
order to be charged with meaningfulness, the “empty” name in question has to recover
its proper circuit in relation to “tÿ ù’n10).” Thus, the route connecting ¶løqeia and d’xa
still remains. 
If the above mentioned is proper, the route in question is probably a circular one.
This conjecture will be strengthened, if we place the solitary fragment 5 (xunÿn d° moà
ùstãn, ”pp’qen ©rxwmai t’qi g™r pßlin âxwmai aÂqij.) before fragment 2. As far as its
subject matter is methodological, the fragment 5 has an affinity with fr.2 or fr.8, but not
with the so-called Doxa part itself. On the other hand, the fragment expresses a kind of
circular movement, which does not fit into the patterns of axiomatic or deductive argu-
ments in fr.2 or fr.8. Moreover, the meshes of fr.5 are too large to pick up the items
involved in fr.8. 
Thus appealing to the elimination by substitution, I come to a conclusion that fr.5
refers to the two terms and in the context of the fragment 1.29-30. If this is acceptable,
we may assume that the Goddess in fragment 5 speaks as follows: ‘it is the same to me
from which between I begin to tell you, since to that point from which I start I shall
come back again.’ Namely, according to this interpretation it follows that there are two
ways connecting ¶løqeia and d’xa: one is the way of negation (the so-called Way of
Truth) and the other is the way of multiplication or linguistic proliferation (the so-called
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Way of Doxa), and they are reciprocatively united in the framework of Parmenides’
onto-methodological thinking. 
The last word may need an explanation bearing on the Parmenidean logic. On the
nature of Parmenidean logic in the context of the Way of Truth, the so-called “standard
Anglo-American interpretation of Parmenides11)” has so far produced many different
variations. For an example, I pick up one, which is my Revised Version12) of F. J.
Pelletier’s13). According to this version, Parmenidean way of Negation is accomplished as
follows: 
I. Either every statement itself is meaningful or its negation is meaningful, but not both.
II. The meaning of statement is the case referred to by the statement at issue.
III. What is the case can be referred to only when it obtains.
For example, the sentence “Parmenides is not flying” is, by I, either meaningful or
meaningless. If Parmenides is not flying, it is not the case that Parmenides is flying.
Hence, by III, the case cannot be referred to. Therefore also, by II, the sentence
“Parmenides is not flying” is meaningless. 
Repeating this procedure likewise, the Parmenideans could sweep away in a moment
not only the statements of non-existent things but also the statements of (apparently)
existent things, all of which the public firmly believes to be real. As the result of this, in
the end, they will realize that ‘m’noj d’ †ti m„qoj ”doéo leàpetai Èj †stn).’ (fr.8.1-2)
Thus, the way may be called “the way of negation.” 
Now, let me go to the way of multiplication or linguistic proliferation. The pivotal
locus disclosing the mechanism of multiplication (fr.8.55-58) is the following: ‘¶ntàa d’
ùkrànanto dûmaj kaã sømat’ †qento cwrãj ¶p’ ¶llølwn, ...úwut¸ pßntose twut’n, t¸ d’
útûrJ m¬ twut’n (they divided form contradistinctively and set them marks apart from
one another).’ The phrase discloses the identity of principles by which mortals con-
structed the world. The division had to be completed simultaneously; whereas once
being divided they had to be here and there topologically and succeed one another in
front and in rear in a time series14). Where Light (day) is now, Night is not there. Note
that this “now” is radically different from that “now” in fr.8.5. The “now” in fr.8.5 is the
absolute “now” (n„n †stin ”mo„ p≠n, ün, sunecûj; fr.8.5-6) standing comparison with Èj
†stin. Thus, mortal’s principles are based on the bridgeless contradiction, the connec-
tion of being and not-being. 
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By the way, it is notable that the starting-point of linguistic proliferation consists in
the very connection of being and not-being. Our thinking inevitably presupposes a
dichotomy between affirmation and negation, active and passive, agent and action, one
and many, and so on. Even a single sentence presupposes at least two terms. For exam-
ple, the sentence ‘Zeno is tall’ requires the two terms of “Zeno” and “tall”. In addition,
“Zeno” also presupposes “not-Zeno”, and likewise “tall” “not-tall”. Without connection of
being and not-being there cannot be any linguistic activity.
Let me observe further some peculiarities of mortals’ principles. They are ‘every-
where identical with itself but not identical with other.’ We can liken them to the positive
and negative poles between which an electric current flows. They are in a complemen-
tary relation one another, so that they are also in a reciprocatively dependent relation
one another. Thus, (1) Light (F) is a complement of its counterpart Night (N), and con-
versely (2) Night (N) is also a complement of its counterpart Light (F), so that (3) the
sum of them (FN) represents an universe of discourse. Then, we can translate the
Goddess’ utterance as follows:
1.  F is the same as F, and, F is not the same as Non-F.
Can we decide the truth-value of this sentence? It seems to be clear that the left side
factor 
2.  F is the same as F
is acceptable to both Goddess and mortals; its acceptability to mortals is self-evident;
and it is true for Goddess too, since 2 does not refer to not-being and the statement ‘F is
the same as F’ is reduced to ‘it is the case that F is.’ Note that ‘F is’ is universally true
in the domain of discourse where there is no other than F. However, the Goddess will
flatly reject the right side factor
3.  F is not the same as Non-F, 
since 3 involves ‘Non-F which refers to not-being. 
However, we, mortals will be much embarrassed by the fact, since 3 is a tautology
and is equivalent to the above 2 which will be sanctioned by the Goddess. Therefore,
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anyone who is mortal should press the Goddess with a question: ‘why do you not accept
a tautological truth such as “F is the same as F,” and, “F is not the same as Non-F”?’
The Goddess’ reply might be as follows: 
‘Oh Koure (see fr.1.24), I do not reject your opinion simply, but I am prepared to con-
cede your point, provided that you could gaze upon those absent things with your mind
as present steadfastly so that you will never cut off being from holding fast to being (see
fr.4). For, Light and Night, to which the wandering dàkranoi (see fr.6.5) stack, really
were not to be ‘two’ but one. For this reason, the conjunction between them had to refer
to the only one ultimate truth: ‘†stin’. Keep this truth in your mind firmly, then the
whole order of things (dißkosmoj) based on it will become a probable one (ùoik’ta)
among all (pßnta), so that any mortal never shall outstrip you in so far as your knowl-
edge is concerned (see fr.8.59-61). Now, you are an enlightened man (see fr.1.3). You
must come back again to your homeland, since there live those men, who naively believe
that ‘everything were born and now are and they will afterwards grow and perish.’ (See
fr.19) Because of this, they are in need of enlightenment. Your message of truth, not of
ultimate truth itself, but of truth in human language, has to be conveyed.’ 
Ⅱ
It is significant that a parallel case with Promenades happened in India. Nagarjuna the
Mahayana Buddhist (150-250 A. D.) declared in his Mulamadhymakarika (XXIV) as
follows15): 
The teaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon two truths:
Truth relating to worldly convention and truth in terms of ultimate fruit. (XXIV.8)
Those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths 
Do not understand the profound truth embranoiodied in the Buddha’s message.
(XXIV.9)
Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught. 
Without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is not attained. (XXIV.10)        
Nagarjuna’s doctrine of two truths originates in the Gautama Buddha who was an east-
ern contemporary of Parmenides. Nagarjuna begins his Mulamadhymakarika (here-
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after: Karika) with the verse of salutation to Gautama Buddha:
I salute him, the fully enlightened, the best of speakers, who preached the non-
ceasing and the non-arising, the non-annihilation and the non-permanence, the non-
identity and the non-difference, the non-appearance and the non-disappearance, the
dependent arising, the quiescent of linguistic proliferation, the auspicious.
The heart to be grasped consists in the words ‘the dependent arising (pratityasamut-
pada), the quiescent of linguistic proliferation (prapancopasama).’ The original idea goes
back to the Buddha-words in Kaccayanagotta-sutta. The Buddha in Kaccayanagotta-
sutta preached to Kaccayana, who asked him ‘what is a right view,’ the necessity of mid-
dle way avoiding two extremes between “is” and “is not”, and showed the doctrine of
dependent-arising (pratityasamutpada)16). 
The dependent arising has two aspects, which are inseparably connected: pravrtti
(activity) and nivrtti (cessation). The former is also prapanca (linguistic proliferation)
by which arises the entire mass of sufferings in the profane world. The latter is the nega-
tion of prapanca, by which the ceasing of entire mass of sufferings will be attained.
It is significant to note that Nagarjuna identifies “the quiescent of linguistic prolifera-
tion” with “emptiness” (sunyata). He says, ‘The linguistic proliferation is extinguished
in emptiness (sunyata).’ (XVIII.5)  
What is then the “sunyata”? A brief historical survey is necessary17). Between the
first century B. C. and first century A. D., the concept of “emptiness” (sunyata) made
its grand appearance in the contexts of the early Mahayana scriptures such as
Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita and Saddharmapundarika-sutra. In revolt against
Abhidharma Buddhists who sought to define the world as having own-nature, the Early
Mahayana Buddhists of Prajnaparamita, who aimed at the spiritual salvation of lay
believers, were bold enough to nullify the entire world under the slogan of “form is
emptiness” (rupam sunyata), where “rupa” is a generic name of the physical and men-
tal constituent elements, perception, conception, volition and so on.
In the second and third centuries A. D., when Nagarjuna was active, the orthodox
Brahmanic schools also were making efforts to formulate their respective systems of
thought. The Samkhya, Nyaya and Vaisesika described the world from their realistic
standpoints. According to the Vaisesika school, the world has a multistoried structure
composed of six (or seven in later times) categories which are themselves imperishable.
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In addition, the Buddhist school such as Sarvastivadin too held a similar world-view to
that of the Vaisesikans. 
Nagarjuna leveled severe criticism at their views. He maintained that it was wrong to
describe the structure of the world. No world with a describable structure was, accord-
ing to him, real. Its essence is emptiness (sunyata) and only a product of the linguistic
proliferation (prapanca). Thus, Nagarjuna’s main aim in the Karika was an exhaustive
negation of prapanca. His main work Mulamadhymakarika consists of approximately
450 verses and is divided into 27 chapters which represents nothing other than the nulli-
fication of linguistic proliferation: the nullification of verbal expression, concepts or
ideas, acts of expression, referents of verbal expression, and the very structure incorpo-
rating all the above elements, namely the entire world. 
His logical skill is worth seeing, because of its striking likeness to Parmenidean or
Zenonean argumentation. For the simplest case, I take up just a part of Chapter II enti-
tled ‘An examination of the traversed and the non-traversed’. Chapter II.1 runs as fol-
lows18):
‘That which has been traversed is not being traversed, nor is that which has not been
traversed being traversed. That which is being traversed other than that which has
been traversed and that which has not been traversed is not being traversed.’
Imagine an arrow (let it be a) which is flying from point A to B. Assume that a point,
where the arrow is now, be C. Let the line AC be ‘that which has been traversed’ and CB
be ‘that which has not been traversed,’ then this verse may be legitimately translated as
follows:
(1) AC is not being traversed by a, because AC has already been traversed.
(2) CB is not being traversed by a, because CB has not yet been traversed.
(3) C is not being traversed by a, because the sum of AC and CB represents the sum
total of that which is to be traversed.
(4) Therefore, the flying arrow a is not flying.
The argument should remind us immediately Parmenides’ refutation of “growth” in frag-
ment 8: ‘How and whence grown? I shall not let you say and conceive, from not-being.’
(fr.8.7-8) The patterns of argumentation by both philosophers are strikingly similar19).
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However, considering the implication of the above (3), I think, Nagarjuna’s skill is more
aptly compared to Zeno’s one. Zeno’s fragment 4 runs as follows: ‘what moves does not
move either in the place in which it is or in the place in which it is not.’ The similarity
becomes patent, if the above mentioned “a”, “AC”, “CB”, and “C” are substituted for
Zeno’s context: ‘a does not move either in C, or, in AC and CB 20).’
Thus Nagarjuna gave a logical exposition of the slogan “form is empty” advocated by
early Prajnaparamita scriptures, and provided early Mahayana Buddhism with a theoret-
ical model.  
However, someone may ask: ‘was Nagarjuna a nihilist?’ Really, there were some
Buddhist metaphysicians who reproached him as follows: ‘if all this is empty, then there
exists no uprising and ceasing. These imply the non-existence of the four noble truths.’
Against this, Nagarjuna replied: ‘you do not understand the purpose of emptiness (sun-
yataya prayojana). As such, you are tormented by emptiness (sunyata) and the
meaning of emptiness (sunyatartha)’ (XXIV.7).
Nagarjuna suggests here three aspects of emptiness: (1) the emptiness as negation of
linguistic proliferation, (2) the emptiness as ultimate truth, and (3) the emptiness actu-
alized in our profane world. He says that these aspects of emptiness should be under-
stood correctly and further ads: ‘whatever is the extremity of freedom (nirvana) is the
extremity of the life-process (samsarana);’ and further ‘between them even a subtle
gap does not exist.’ (XXV.20) 
We could schematize the linkage between these aspects as follows 21):
The meaning of this diagram can be roughly explained as follows:
(1) The profane world (samvrti): this is the world of appearance, which is multiplied by
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the linguistic proliferation and the world of “the entire mass of suffering,” wherein
we live and naively believe the reality of things.
(2) The ultimate truth or dependent arising (paramarthatya): this is the extremity that
is attained through (a) the way of nivrtti or by the emptiness (sunyata). The
“nivrtti” means etymologically “withdrawal from a certain thing.” The way of nivrtti
means an exhaustive withdrawal from samvrti and the cessation of all activities in
the profane world. Thus, the solidity of world as well as the substantiality of self is
puffed out completely by the ultimate truth and the nirvana is attained.
(3) The freedom (nirvana): This is the extremity of enlightenment attained by para-
marthatya. The language cannot express this extremity.
(4) The conventional truth (samvrtisatya): Nagarjuna calls this “provisional designa-
tion” (prajnaptir upadaya) and identifies with “the middle way” (madyama).
(XXIV.18b) The “provisional designation” means the verbalized form of ultimate
truth. Therefore, the conventional truth is no other than ultimate truth in verbalized
form. It shows ultimate truth projected to the profane dimension. In other words, it
is no other than the nirvana realized through (b) the way of pravrtti. 
The two reciprocative vectors of nivrtti and pravrtti are so tightly united into a circular
way that those two truths and two worlds become two facets of just the same reality.
Thus, the circle of pratityasamutpada was brought to its completion.
Ⅲ
Two philosophers in West and East went along the way of methodological negation to
the ultimate truth and came back again to their fellowmen’s native land in order to tell
them the truth in human language.
They preached to people on the doctrine of dual truth, namely the doctrine of two
truths, which respectively relate to worldly convention and ultimate vision of the reality.
Thus telling the dual truth, they never divorced themselves from the conventional world;
on the contrary, they announced a fundamental guiding principle, which connects the
conventional world-view to what is real. By virtue of their own original methods of argu-
ment, they pointed to a path negating the conventional world-view and led to ultimate
truth. In addition to this, they also showed a way founding conventional views on ulti-
mate truth. Once ultimate truth is attained, the conventional becomes something to be
sanctioned as a kind of truth.
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Two philosophers in West and East recovered a port of truth, whereto one should
finally make a homeward voyage.
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ceives with right wisdom the ceasing of the world as it has come to be, the notion of existence in
the world does not occur. The world, for the most part, Kaccayana, is bound by approach, grasping
and inclination. And he who does not follow that approach and grasping, that determination of
mind, that inclination and disposition, who does not cling to or adhere to a view: “This is my self,”
who thinks: “suffering that is subject to arising arises; suffering that is subject to ceasing, ceases,”
such a person does not doubt, is not perplexed; Herein, his knowledge is not other-dependent.
Thus far, Kaccayana, there is “right view.” “Everything exists,” — this, Kaccayana, is one extreme.
“Everything does not exist,” — this, Kaccayana, is the second extreme.’
17) Among many good introductions to the history of formation of the early Mahayana Buddhism and
the concept of sunyata I recommend here Musashi Tachikawa’s description of it in his An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Nagarjuna, translated by Rolf W. Giebel, Motilal Banarsidass
Publishers, Private Limited, Delhi, 1997, which is a revised version of his Japanese book entitled Ku
no Kozo (The Structure of Emptiness), Daisan Bunmeisha, 1986. My brief sketch mainly follows
Tachikawa’s description. 
18) Here I follow Tachikawa’s translation; See p. 54.
19) For the details of Parmenidean negation of growth, see my article ‘Reductio ad absurdum, On the
Origin of Indirect Proof’ in my book Greek philosophy and the Modern World, Studies in Greek
Philosophy Series, The International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1998, pp. 60-61.
20) For the detailed explanation of Zeno’s refutation against motion, see my book Zenon, Yottsuno
Gyakuri (Zeno, Four Paradoxes of Motion), Kodan-sha, 1996.
21) Mituyoshi Saigusa in his ‘Shoki Daijo no Ninshikiron (Epistemology of the Early Mahayana
Buddhism)’, Koza Bukkyo-Shiso, Vol. 2, 1974 showed the following schema:
samvrti→samvrtisatya→paramarthatya→nirvana→samvrti.
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However, his interpretation seems to be contradictory to Nagarjuna’s words. According to
Nagarjuna, samvrtisatya is prajnaptir upadaya (provisional designation = the verbalized form of
ultimate truth) which is identified with “the middle way” (madyama) (XXIV.18b). Presenting the
above diagram, I deferred to Tachikawa’s interpretation.
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〔追　記〕
松尾さんが亡くなったとは，なんとも寂しいかぎりだ。阪南での仲間が，また一人減った。晩年の彼とはあまりお
つき合いがなかったが，私は，彼の名だたる悪友のうちの一人だったはずだ。鶴橋や桃谷の一杯飲み屋でとことん呑
んで議論した昔の日々が思い出される。
彼の口癖の一つに，「真理に東西はない。真理はただ一つあるのみ」というのがあった。これはまあ，なかなか，
いい線を行っている。が，しかし，だいたい彼の議論は大雑把で，たいてい私によって徹底的に論破されるのが落ち
であった。これもその口で，論証がいいかげんなので，その破れ目を突っついては，ずいぶんとからかい，彼を怒ら
せたものだ。
だが今は，それも懐かしい。そこで，「真理」をめぐる東西の二人の哲学者，パルメニデスとナーガールジュナ
（龍樹），についての一論文を，彼に献呈することにした。
英文で書いたのは，なんのことはない，彼が英語の教師だったからである。彼にも反撃の機会を与えたかったの
だ。あの世で，松尾さんよ，私の英語を読み，どうか存分に冷やかしてもらいたい。もっとも，あなたにはギリシア
語やサンスクリット語は充分には読めまい。しかし，手紙というものがある。疑問があれば，どうか問い合わせても
らいたい。それでは，また。
2001年10月10日
山　川　偉　也
（2001年10月12日受理）
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